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Abstract
I investigate the decision-making process of an owner of abandoned farmland that is
currently restricted to agricultural use but will be available for nonagricultural use in the
future. I nd that a slight probability of land conversion greatly increases the land value
and discourages the owner from cultivating the land. I also observe that a small gap in
the anticipation of land conversion prevents the owner from selling or leasing the land to
a more ecient farmer.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been increasing concern about whether food production can keep pace
with population growth in the future ([6]). Promoting the eective use of agricultural
land is critical in resolving the issue. However, abandoned farmland that will not be
cultivated for several years has become more prevalent in Japan. In fact, Japan's total
area of abandoned farmland has almost tripled in the last two decades.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the problem of abandoned farmland and oer
suggestions for promoting its eective use. I investigate the decision-making process of an
owner of abandoned land using the real options framework. The real options approach, in
which option pricing theory is applied to real investment problems, is useful in evaluating
land development in the face of uncertainty about cash ows from the development ([14, 1,
2, 5]). For instance, [1, 2] apply real options models to land conversion decisions, whereas
[5] investigates land development timing with an alternative land use choice in terms of
a max-option. Several papers, including [12, 11, 10], provide empirical evidence for real
options valuations. Although the previous studies assume that the owner optimizes the
development (or conversion) timing, this is not the case with Japan's abandoned farmland.
In most cases, abandoned farmland is currently restricted to agricultural use but will be
available for nonagricultural use with environmental and regulatory changes at some point
in the future.
This paper models the decision-making process of an owner of abandoned farmland
as follows. An opportunity that enables development for nonagricultural use comes as an
exponential distribution. Before the arrival of the conversion opportunity, the owner has
the option to cultivate the land with sunk costs at an arbitrary time. As soon as the land
conversion opportunity arrives, the owner will immediately sell the land to a developer
for residential or commercial use. This assumption is consistent with the fact that the
price of land for nonagricultural use is much higher than that of land for agricultural use.
To maintain brevity, I assume that cash ows from agricultural and nonagricultural land
use follow bi-dimensional geometric Brownian motions.
Although the problem is expressed as a complex bi-dimensional optimal stopping prob-
lem, I reduce it to a standard one-dimensional problem and derive a closed-form solution
under plausible assumptions. The value of abandoned land is derived as a sum of the
values of the cultivation option and prospective land conversion. Further, I calibrate the
model with Japan's land price data from 2005. Results show that a slight probability of
conversion greatly increases the value of abandoned land and discourages the owner from
cultivating the land. I argue that, in order to promote agricultural use of land, the gov-
ernment needs a zoning ordinance that completely removes owners' anticipation of land
conversion. It seems that owners' abandonment of farmland is primarily caused by the
insucient restriction.
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In addition, I explore why an owner of abandoned farmland neither sell nor lease
the land to a more ecient farmer. With the same anticipation of land conversion, an
inecient owner would sell or lease the land to a more experienced farmer who is eager to
cultivate it. However, in Japan's current system, less productive farmers are more likely
to receive permission for land conversion. As a result, the anticipation of land conversion
diers between inecient and ecient farmers. I demonstrate that only a small gap in
the anticipation prevents the owner of abandoned land from selling or leasing the land to
a more productive farmer. As a policy implication, I argue that the government needs a
unied guideline for all farmers, even if it does not completely remove the anticipation
of land conversion due to the prospective Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP) which might
force the government to deregulate the conversion of agricultural land.
2 Abandoned farmland in Japan
Abandoned farmland is dened as farmland that has been left idle for more than one year
and will not be cultivated for several years. It is inecient from the perspective of land
use and has negative consequences, such as increasing the prevalence of harmful insects
and the illegal dumping of waste, on the community. Recently, a proliferation in the
amount of abandoned farmland has become a serious issue in Japan. Japan's total area
of abandoned farmland increased from about 130; 000 hectares in 1985 to about 386; 000
hectares in 2005. Typically, owners of abandoned farmland are heirs to their parents' land.
They have jobs in urban areas and do not intend to cultivate the inherited land. Many
individuals who are engaged in agriculture are aging, which will aggravate the problem of
inheritance. Tax savings and the conversion of agricultural land are major reasons why
owners of abandoned farmland neither sell nor lease their abandoned land. In this paper,
I concentrate on the problem of land conversion. According to [13] who investigates the
case of rice land in Japan, the price of land converted for nonagricultural use is almost
ve times higher than the original price.
In Japan, the Agricultural Land Act controls the conversion of farmland to protect
agricultural land. In principle, owners need to receive permission from the prefectural
governor (or the minister of agriculture in cases involving more than 4 hectares) when they
are ready to covert agricultural land for other use. Agricultural land is classied into ve
categories which determine the permission guidelines. For the purpose of improving the
food self-suciency rate, almost 90% of farmland is classied into a category that is zoned
by the Prefectural Programs for Establishment of Agricultural Promotion Regions. The
conversion of farmland in this category for nonagricultural use is supposed to be impossible
\in principle." However, the guideline, unlike zoning ordinances in the European Union,
is not executed rigorously. Actually, for some obscure reason, owners are sometimes
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permitted to convert farmland in this category for nonagricultural use. For example,
in 2005, 0:31% of rice land was converted for nonagricultural use ([13]). In addition, in
Japan's current system, the possibility of obtaining permission for land conversion is higher
if a farmer is less ecient (e.g., those with small-scale and unproductive farms). This
ambiguous restriction increases owners' anticipation of converting abandoned farmland
for nonagricultural use.
The TPP is the multilateral free-trade agreement that aims to integrate the economies
of the Asia-Pacic region. The Japanese government is currently facing a dicult decision
regarding whether to join the TPP. Although entry into the TPP is required to maintain
the competence of the Japanese manufacturing industry, the elimination of taris on
key agricultural products by the TPP has created serious concerns among farmers. The
agriculture ministry claims that the elimination of agricultural tari greatly increases
the number of imports of cheaper farm products from the Asia-Pacic region, forcing
many small-scale farms to close. Naturally, the conversion of agricultural land will be
greatly deregulated if Japan decides to join the TPP. This uncertainty about the TPP
also increases owners' anticipation of land conversion in the future.
3 Real options valuation
Consider an owner of abandoned farmland. The land is restricted to agricultural use
at the initial time, but an opportunity that enables nonagricultural development arrives
as an exponential distribution (Poisson arrival) with intensity . Note that rare events
such as regulatory and environmental changes are usually modeled as Poisson arrivals
in the real options literature (e.g., [7]). Cultivating abandoned land for agricultural use
requires initial investment costs of I1(> 0), while developing the land for nonagricultural
use requires initial investment costs of I2(> 0). The land generates risk-adjusted cash
ows X1(t) by agricultural use and X2(t) by nonagricultural use. The risk-adjusted cash
ows X(t) = (X1(t); X2(t)) are random and follow geometric Brownian motions
dXi(t) = iXi(t)dt+ iXi(t)dBi(t); Xi(0) = xi(> 0)
where B1(t); B2(t) are Brownian motions with correlation coecient . Constants i
and i(> 0) denote the risk-adjusted growth rate and volatility, respectively. Mathe-
matically, the model is built on the ltered probability space (
;F ; P ;Ft) generated by
(B1(t); B2(t)). The set Ft represents the set of available information at time t, and the
owner optimizes the policy under this information. The risk-free rate is a constant r(> 0).
For convergence, r >  is assumed. Refer to [4] for the economic rationale for this as-
sumption.
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3.1 Model solution
This section provides a real options valuation for abandoned farmland. The value of
abandoned (cultivated) farmland that is available for nonagricultural purpose is denoted
by F0(X(t)) (F1(X(t))) for the state variablesX(t). ForX(0) = x, the value of abandoned
farmland is expressed as the following optimal stopping problem:
V (x;) := sup
2T
E[
Z 1
0
f1f<yg
Z y

e rtX1(t)dt  e rI1 + e ryF1(X(y))

+1fyge ryF0(X(y))ge ydy]; (1)
where T denotes the set of all stopping times. In (1),  means the time of cultivation,
while y means the time when the land permission conversion is provided. At t = y, the
value of land becomes F0(X(y)) for y   and F1(X(y)) for y >  . Formally, F0(X(t)) is
the value of the option to develop the land for either agricultural or nonagricultural use,
whereas F1(X(t)) consists of a current cash ow from the cultivated land and the option
value of the nonagricultural development. Both F0(X(t)) and F1(X(t)) may include the
value of the option to switch between agricultural and nonagricultural land use in the
future. It is impossible to derive any closed-form solution to the bi-dimensional problem
(1), although several studies, including [3, 8, 9], showed the properties of solutions to
multi-dimensional optimal stopping problems.
As mentioned in the previous section, in reality, the price of land converted for nonagri-
cultural use is almost ve times higher than that of land for agricultural use ([13]). When
permitted to convert agricultural land to nonagricultural use, most owners immediately
sell the land to residential or commercial developers. Considering this fact, I assume that
x1
r   1   I1 <<
x2
r   2   I2 (2)
and
F0(X(t)) = F1(X(t)) = E[
Z 1
t
e r(s t)X2(s)ds  I2 j Ft] = X2(t)
r   2   I2: (3)
Assumption (3) means that land is developed for nonagricultural use as soon as the land
conversion permission is provided. This is a good approximation of the reality. In addition,
by (3) I can reduce problem (1) to a standard one-dimensional optimal stopping problem
and derive a closed-form solution as follows.
Proposition 1
V (x;) = V1(x1;) + V2(x2;); (4)
where
V1(x1;) :=
8>>><>>>:

x1()
r +   1   I1

x1
x1()

(0 < x1 < x

1())
x1
r +   1   I1 (x1  x

1());
(5)
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x1() :=
(r +   1)I1
   1 (6)
 :=
1
2
  1
21
+
s
1
21
  1
2
2
+
2(r + )
21
V2(x2;) :=
x2
(r   2)(r +   2)  
I2
r + 
: (7)
Proof By (3) I can simplify (1) as follows:
V (x;)
= sup
2T
E[
Z 1
0

1f<yg
Z y

e rtX1(t)dt  e rI1

+ e ry

X2(y)
r   2   I2

e ydy]
= sup
2T
E[
Z 1

Z y

e rtX1(t)dt  e rI1

e ydy] +
x2
(r   2)(r +   2)  
I2
r + 
= sup
2T
E[e (r+)

X1()
r +   1   I1

]| {z }
=V1(x1;) one-dimensional problem
+
x2
(r   2)(r +   2)  
I2
r + | {z }
=V2(x2;)
: (8)
To obtain (8), I used
E[
Z 1

Z y

e rtX1(t)dt  e rI1

e ydy]
= E[
Z 1
0
Z y+

e rtX1(t)dt  e rI1

e (y+)dy] (9)
= E[
Z 1
0
Z y+

e rtX1(t)dt

e (y+)dy]  E[e (r+)I1]
= E[
Z 1
0
e rX1()(1  e (r 1)y)
r   1 e
 (y+)dy]  E[e (r+)I1] (10)
= E[e (r+)
X1()
r +   1 ]  E[e
 (r+)I1];
where I used the change of variables in (9), while I obtained (10) by the tower property
and the strong Markov property of X1(t). Note that, in (8), the optimal stopping problem
V1(x1;) depends only on X1(t). This enables us to derive the value function (5) and the
threshold (6) in closed forms (e.g., [4]). The proof is complete. 
Proposition 1 shows that the value of abandoned farmland, V (x;), is composed of two
values: the value of the option to cultivate the land, V1(x1;), and the value of prospective
land conversion, V2(x2;). The owner cultivates the land which is restricted to agricultural
use when the cash ow from farm products, X1(t), increases above the threshold x

1. The
decision on the cultivation timing is independent of the dynamics of the cash ow by
nonagricultural use, X2(t). When the intensity  goes to 0, V (x;) converges to V1(x; 0).
On the other hand, when  goes to 1, V (x;) converges to x2=(r 2)  I2, which is the
value of the immediate development for nonagricultural use. By (2), (4), and (6) I have
@V (x;)=@ > 0 and dx1()=d > 0.
5
3.2 Model calibration
In the following numerical example, I consider a typical case. The owner has another job
and owns 50 ares of farmland, which has been abandoned for many years. In 2005, the
average price of 50 ares of rice land was approximately 27 million yen (the exchange rate
average was 1 yen  0:009 dollars in that year), whereas the average price of land that
was permitted to convert for nonagricultural use was 130 million yen ([13]). I set the
initial investment cost as I1 = 15 million yen which consists of three parts:
I1E = 5 million yen: Extra costs stemming from abandoned land. Preliminary work, such
as restoring soil, is required to convert abandoned land into farmland.
I1O = 8 million yen: Ordinary initial costs of cultivation. Farming equipment, such as a
farm tractor, requires high initial costs.
I1I = 2 million yen: Costs stemming from the owner's ineciency. The owner is less
ecient than an average farmer because he/she is not accustomed to farming.
Plausible parameter values of r = 0:07; 1 = 0:03, and 1 = 0:2 are assumed. To t
the fact that the average price of farmland was 27 million yen, I set the value of x1 as a
solution to
x1
r   1   I1O = 27:
Therefore, I have x1 = 1:4, which means that the annual income reaches approximately
1:4 million yen from the cultivated farmland. This value is consistent with the average
income from farm products at a small farm. Note that an owner of a small farm frequently
has another job. To t the fact that the average price of converted land was 130 million
yen, I set
x2
r   2   I2 = 130: (11)
However, it is dicult to estimate x2 and I2 individually because they dier across land
uses. To avoid this calibration challenge, I set the plausible parameter value of 2 = 0.
In this case, I do not need to specify x2 and I2 because by (7) and (11) I have
V2(x2;) =

r + 
x2
r
  I2

=
130
0:07 + 
:
For expositional purposes, I dene p :=   log(1   ), which denotes the probability
that the land conversion permission will be provided within one year. As mentioned in
Section 2, in 2005, 0:31% of rice land was converted for other use. This percentage is not
equal to p because not all farmers applied for land conversion permission. In addition, the
percentage depends greatly on the regions and farm scales. For instance, more than 1%
of race land was converted around urban areas, such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Osaka. In
this paper, I present the results with varying levels of p from 0 to 0:05(= 5%).
Figure 1 shows the land value V (x;), value of the cultivation option, V1(x1;), value
of prospective land conversion, V2(x2;), and threshold x

1(). A slight probability of
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land conversion greatly increases V (x;) and x1(). For example, compared to V (x;) =
20:1; V1(x1;) = 20:1; V2(x2;) = 0, and x

1() = 1:54 million yen for p = 0, I have
V (x;) = 30:2; V1(x1;) = 13:95; V2(x2;) = 16:25, and x

1() = 1:93 million yen for
p = 0:01 = (1%). Only a small probability of land conversion makes V2(x2;) higher than
V1(x1;). Note that, the nonagricultural value (11) does not inuence x

1(), although
it inuences V (x;). In conclusion, in order to promote agricultural use of land, the
government needs a zoning ordinance that completely removes owners' anticipation of land
conversion. The problem of abandoned farmland primarily arises from Japan's insucient
restriction.
Next, I consider why inecient owners of abandoned land neither sell nor lease the
land to farmers who are experienced in managing large farmland. Assume that an ecient
farmer requires an investment cost of I1 := I1E + I1O = 13 million yen, which is lower
than I1 = I1E+I1O+I1I = 15 million yen for the inecient owner. Figure 2 compares the
cases of I1 = 15 and I1 = 13. For I1 = 13, due to the eciency, the land value V (x;) is
higher and the cultivation threshold x1() is lower. Then, with the same anticipation of
land conversion, the owner would sell or lease the land to the eective farmer who is more
eager to cultivate the land. However, this is not the case. In Japan's current system, p is
higher for the inecient owner than the ecient farmer. As mentioned in Section 2, the
possibility of obtaining land conversion permission is greater for less ecient farmers. In
addition, productive farmers, such as agricultural corporations, rarely attempt to convert
agricultural land for other use. The left panel in Figure 2 shows that, with only a small
gap in p, the land value for the inecient owner increases far beyond that of the ecient
farmer. This prevents the inecient owner from selling or leasing the land. Accordingly,
I argue that the government needs a unied guideline for all farmers, even if it does
not completely remove the inuence of owners' anticipation of land conversion due to
uncertainty about the TPP.
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